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The KORUS FTA on Foreign Law Firms
and Attorneys in South Korea—a
Contemporary Analysis on Expansion
into East Asia
By Jeanne Lee John*
Abstract: South Korea has historically restricted foreign entry into its domestic
legal services market, but has finally opened up its market to the practicing
attorneys of any country with which it has a free trade agreement. U.S. firms
and attorneys have been applying to open offices in Korea since March 2012,
when the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement went into effect. The global legal
community has been forecasting the moves into Korea as well as the broader
effect foreign entry will have on the Korean domestic legal services market.
Many point to Germany as the gloomy example of a country whose certain legal
markets were dominated by foreign presence. Few recall Japan, where foreign
and domestic firms adapt to and complement each other’s market strength, even
though Korea has specifically modeled its own liberalization after Japan’s
market opening over the last fifteen years. This Comment provides an analysis
of the buzz surrounding Korea’s legal services market liberalization, specifically
addressing perceptions both for and against it. By focusing on (1) the legal
education system, (2) the history leading up to foreign entry and the period of
time following foreign entry, as well as (3) the current state of the legal services
market in Germany, Japan, and Korea, this Comment concludes with five
lessons that suggest that Korea’s legal services market will remain relatively
unchanged.

* Candidate for joint J.D. and LL.M. in International Human Rights, 2014, Northwestern
University School of Law; B.A., Political Science and Psychology, 2008, Northwestern
University. I would like to thank: Brian Park for this topic; DeJohn Allen for the right
encouragement; Pat Disbennett for our extensive quibbles; Sumin Kim for being an
acceptable life coach; and Mirae Yang for walking with me to print and submit this. Lastly,
but not least-ly, Matthew Kim, for all the quesadillas, and my parents and brothers, for all
the love—thank you.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law firms are exploring the benefits of a geographically diverse
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footprint by looking for growth opportunities abroad.1 In fact, the largest
U.S.-based law firms have grown in their activities abroad at a rate of tento-one over their growth within U.S. borders.2 In light of the financial
turmoil shaking the globe since 2008, however, lawyers and law firms are
warily testing “the promise of benefits from a diversified practice” that
reaches the laws and people in jurisdictions around the world.3 As firms
and attorneys in the Eastern and Western hemispheres of the globe
contemplate setting up shop in South Korea (Korea)4, now an emerging
option for expansion, this Comment spotlights the liberalization of the
Korean legal services market.
Foreign attorneys or law firms have never been allowed to work
autonomously in Korea—until now. Korea has entered into Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) with countries around the world to affirmatively allow
foreign entry into its legal market for the first time in history. 5 In October
2011, both chambers of the U.S. Congress approved legislation to
implement the FTA between Korea and the United States (KORUS FTA),
which President Obama signed into law.6 Just one month later, the Korean
National Assembly also passed the agreement.7 By March 15, 2012, the
FTA had entered into force.8 U.S. firms and attorneys will now join those
of other countries with whom Korea has FTAs in the pool of legal
professionals eligible to finally enter the Korean legal services market.
Proponents of the legal market liberalization in particular have always
argued that the opening will lead to lower legal costs, and increase the
overall quality of legal services in Korea because of increased competition.9
A ministry official explained that the anticipation would galvanize the local
1

Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 43 INT’L LAW. 943, 943 (2009).
Id.
3
Id.
4
While “Korea” may accurately refer to either North Korea or South Korea, or even the
two sovereign states combined, for purposes of this Comment, the term will be used as a less
cumbersome reference to South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea.
5
Si-soo Park, Foreign Law Firms Can Open Consultant Offices Here, KOR. TIMES (Mar.
3,
2009,
6:31
PM),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/117_40616.html.
6
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41,
125 Stat. 428 (2011).
7
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Statement by U.S. Trade Rep. Ron Kirk
on Kor. Parliament’s Passage of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november/statement-us-traderepresentative-ron-kirk-korean.
8
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S., Kor. Set Date for Entry Into Force
of U.S.-Kor. Trade Agreement (Feb. 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2012/february/united-states-korea-set-date-entry-force-us-korea.
9
See, e.g., Hyung Tae Kim, Comment, Legal Market Liberalization in South Korea:
Preparations for Change, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 199, 212–15 (2006).
2
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bar association, domestic firms, and Korean attorneys, and that the ultimate
goal of the opening was not to create more jobs for foreigners but to
upgrade the Korean legal services industry.10 Moreover, these proponents
have predicted that foreign firms will not directly compete with Korean
firms, but rather carve out their own niches in cross-border practices areas,11
focusing on international transactions, capital markets, and foreign
investment related matters.12 Finally, liberalization proponents suggest that
the resulting presence of and collaboration with U.S. firms in particular will
attract foreign direct investment activity to benefit all.13
The reaction to the liberalization, however, has not been entirely
positive, and it is perhaps the nerves of the domestic legal community that
have made the wait more buzz-worthy. The legal community and local bar
of Korea have expressed concern that domestic firms in Korea are currently
inadequate and too underdeveloped to compete with foreign firms.14 As
early as 2007, attorneys in prominent positions at top law firms in Korea
were making statements of what should or would be done with foreign
entry into their markets.15 These attorneys warned that domestic law firms
would either lose their elite employees to foreign firms or be forced to carry
out a restructuring.16 They stated that these domestic firms had to build a
more solid foundation through aggressive local mergers and acquisitions
(M&A).17 The discourse regarding the future of the Korean legal services
market has healthily raised a global awareness of the hopeful expectations
as well as potential problems of the opening, but nonetheless has largely
lacked a cohesive and methodical analysis, which this Comment
consequently attempts to provide.
After a review of the history leading up to the anticipated opening to
foreign entry of legal professionals in Korea in Parts II and III, Part IV of
10

Park, supra note 5.
H. Park et al., South Korean Law Firms in Expansion Mode Following Legal Market
Liberalization,
FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
12,
2011,
9:18
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9a4931de-c51e-11e0-ba5100144feabdc0.html#axzz1izo2z6yd.
12
For an example of a firm’s Korea practice, see Korea, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &
HAMILTON LLP, http://www.cgsh.com/korea/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (highlighting the
firm’s extensive experience in transactional work, specifically with assisting clients on
capital investment).
13
Choong-yong Ahn, Time for FDI Through KORUS FTA, KOR. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2011,
4:19 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/bizfocus/2011/12/346_100547.html;
Sang Hyuk Park & Gene Oh Kim, Foreign Investment in Korea, AM. LAW., May 2011, at
75.
14
Kim, supra note 9, at 215–19.
15
See Domestic Law Firms Face Tough Competition, DONG-A ILBO (Apr. 13, 2007, 7:58
AM), available at http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2007041342438.
16
Id.
17
Id.
11
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this Comment analyzes the development of legal markets in Germany and
Japan over the past thirty years: Germany as an commonly cited example of
the success, perhaps domination, large foreign law firms have achieved in a
country, and Japan as an example of a once highly protectionist East Asian
country from which Korea has modeled its current liberalization. By
comparing and contrasting the past and current status of the legal profession
and legal markets in Germany, Japan, and Korea, Part V concludes with
five lessons which propose that Korea’s legal market will likely remain
relatively unchanged. Specifically, because of its sophisticated domestic
legal market and use of dual-educated local attorneys, heightened awareness
of international branding, and small pool of clients in need of foreign legal
advice, Korea will make way for increased legal services specialization,
maintain its elite local large law firms, continue to share its legal market
with previously established Korea practices of foreign law firms, and see
more U.S. than U.K. presence.
II. THE BUZZ: WHO CARES ABOUT KOREA?
The entry into Korea’s legal services market has been the cause of both
hope and anxiety for at least six decades.18 The practice of law in Korea
was restricted to Korean nationals for forty-seven years, until 1996, when
the Korean Attorney-at-Law Act—which governs the practice of law and
qualifications of attorneys—was revised for the first time to theoretically
allow foreign legal participation in Korea.19 The actual acknowledged and
official legal practice of foreigners in Korea never occurred, however, until
recently.20 The talk surrounding the opening of Korea’s legal market has
been seen on both sides of the world, and has not been confined to chatter
18

See generally Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949 (S.
Kor.) (first version of the Attorney-At-Law Act, which has been amended numerous times
since).
19
See id., amended by Act No. 5177, June 30, 1996, arts. 4, 6 (S. Kor.).
20
See discussion infra Part III. As a note to the self-conscious reader, foreign attorneys
are not freely permitted to practice in the United States. Just as attorneys in the United
States are regulated by the bar council of every state, oversight of foreign-educated law
graduates and foreign-licensed lawyers is also controlled by each state of the Union, and
varies across the country. The different approaches and considerations regarding foreign
attorneys include allowing for temporary practice, permitting lawyers to practice as foreign
legal consultants, and allowing full admission. See Carol A. Needham, Practicing Non-U.S.
Law in the United States: Multijurisdictional Practice, Foreign Legal Consultants and Other
Aspects of Cross-Border Legal Practice, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 605 (2007) (focusing on
provisions in the United States that govern in-bound practice by lawyers licensed in other
countries). For more resources on the various issues surrounding U.S. transnational legal
practice developments, see American Bar Association, Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice,
AM.
B.
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/co
mmission_on_multijurisditional_practice.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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in the legal community. Rather, “Korea” has been the buzzword for media
outlets,21 legal and business professionals, and government agencies in both
the United States and Korea.
Korea has grown to be among the world’s twenty largest economies
since it was established only sixty-four years ago.22 Although its total
population23 is about twice the size of the population of Texas,24 and it takes
up a geographic space that is only slightly bigger than the state of Indiana,25
Korea has transformed into one of the world’s leading economies and is
now home to major business conglomerates, such as Samsung, LG, and
Hyundai-Kia Motors, making it an attractive business market.26
Geographically, it is well situated for business in Northern Asia between
China and Japan—two of the world’s largest economies.27 Politically,
Korean leaders have a large regional role in the East Asian area, and the
Korean government is an integral consideration for U.S. foreign policy with
regards to China and North Korea.28
According to the Obama
administration, “ . . . South Korea has emerged as the United States’ closest
ally in East Asia.”29
Consequently, the KORUS FTA has received much public attention,
mentioned in 2012 by President Obama in his first State of the Union
address following the FTA’s ratification.30 With the earlier passing of an
FTA between the European Union (EU) and Korea (KOREU FTA)31 in July
21

A Google search one month after the ratification by both countries resulted in
numerous articles by The American Lawyer, The Asian Lawyer, JD Journal, the New York
Times, and Bloomberg Businessweek, for example. The same search done on the eve of the
KORUS FTA’s entry into force in mid-March 2012 resulted in more articles in the
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, the Orange County Register,
and CNN Money.
22
The April 2012 estimate of the Korean population was 48,754,657. Background Note:
South
Korea,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Apr.
12,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm.
23
Id.
24
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 § 1,
at 21 (2011).
25
Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22.
26
MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41481, U.S.-SOUTH KOREA
RELATIONS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf; see also
Emad Mekay, US Readies for Korean Business, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ID04Dg01.html (citing favorable and unfavorable
business sentiments regarding the FTA around its signing in 2007).
27
Spotlight on Korea: Korea Q&A, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2010, at 84.
28
MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 7–8.
29
Id. at 1.
30
See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address: An America Built to Last
(Jan.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cspan.org/uploadedFiles/Content/The_Administration/State_of_the_Union/SOTU-2012.pdf.
31
An EU priority during FTA negotiations with Korea was to secure Korea’s
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2011,32 the U.S. government had been under pressure not to fall behind to
the opportunities an FTA with Korea would allow for legal services and
other markets alike.33 The KORUS FTA is the United States’ second
largest FTA after the North American Free Trade Agreement, as well as
Korea’s second largest FTA after the KOREU FTA.34 Economists have
projected that the KORUS FTA will generate billions of dollars in increased
trade and investment between the two countries, boosting economic growth
and job creation for both.35
Korea has also been particularly aggressive in the FTA push, having
completed six other FTAs besides the KORUS FTA since 2002,36 and
beginning negotiations on several others,37 including most recently with
eyes on China.38 Soon after the KORUS FTA was signed, former
commitment to allow EU law firms to increase their onsite presence in Korea. The KOREU
FTA, like the KORUS FTA, has given EU-based law firms and attorneys access to Korea’s
legal market in a procedure similar to that given to the United States. See generally 2011
O.J.
(L
127),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL:EN:PDF.
For
example, the entry will be done in three similar stages. Id. at Annex 7-A-4, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145171.pdf; see also discussion
infra Part III.C. For an in-depth analysis of the KOREU FTA and its implications for the
United States, see WILLIAM H. COOPER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41534, THE EUSOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1–
24 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41534.pdf. For an overview of the
differences between KORUS FTA and KOREU FTA, see Yeongkwan Song, KORUS FTA
vs. Korea-EU FTA: Why the Differences?, KOR. ECON. INST. ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES, May
2011, available at http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/song_final_paper.pdf.
32
MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
33
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Trade Rep. Ron Kirk Calls for
Swift Passage of Trade Agreements (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/2011/october/us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-calls-swift-passa.
34
MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
35
Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22; but cf. Why We Oppose the KORUS
FTA—KCTU Position Paper on KORUS FTA, KOR. CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS
(Feb.
8,
2011,
9:47
AM),
http://kctu.org/?mid=documents&listStyle=gallery&document_srl=9928 (arguing that the
KORUS FTA will kill jobs, damage domestic industries, and lead to failure to meet labor
standards). For a U.S. report on negotiations leading up to the KORUS FTA, see The U.S.Korea Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Hearing on the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement Negotiations Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 110th Cong. 26 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg40312/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg40312.pdf.
36
COOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 24 (Chile, Singapore, India, Peru, EU, and the
ASEAN, which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam).
37
Id. (Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Turkey, and the GCC, which
includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman);
MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
38
See John Power, Should Korea Sign an FTA with China?, KOR. HERALD (Feb. 6, 2012,
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“President Lee Myung-bak was elected in December 2007 on a platform
that promised to boost [the country’s] economic growth rate through
deregulation . . . increased [foreign direct investment] . . . and . . . FTAs
with major markets.”39 Indeed, Korea’s regulatory environment is
increasingly business friendly,40 having very few remaining barriers to
foreign direct investment.41 Keeping the significance of Korea’s overall
market and economy in mind, Part III turns to the history behind Korea’s
legal system.
III. THE WAIT: A HISTORY LESSON ON THE KOREAN LEGAL
SYSTEM
Some have called the restriction on foreign entry into the Korean legal
services market “a draconian [one] unique among the major East Asian
countries.”42 Indeed Korea is the last country of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)43 to officially liberalize
its legal services market.44 Korea has always prohibited foreign law firms
“from opening offices in Korea, forming partnerships with Korean law
firms, and recruiting Korean lawyers to provide . . . multijurisdictional
services.”45 Foreign lawyers who have worked for Korean law firms have
10:45 AM), http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120205000382.
39
Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22.
40
Kyung-Won Choi et al., Korea Recent Trends in Government Enforcement and
Dispute Resolution, AM. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 90, 90.
41
Q&A Kim & Chang, AM. LAW., Oct. 2008, at 105, 105.
42
Id. at 127.
43
The OECD, established in 1961, is an international organization helping governments
promote policies that “will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the
world.”
About
the
OECD,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012). Its member countries include all of the former G7 states. Member Countries,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2012).
44
The Impact of Legal Market Liberalization in Korea on U.S. Firms, KOR. SOC’Y,
http://www.koreasociety.org/business/business/the_impact_of_legal_market_liberalization_i
n_korea_on_u.s._firms.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (providing an abstract for the April 8,
2008 presentation by attorney David Cho of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, on the
expected practical impacts of the KORUS FTA on his practice). Admittedly, other countries
that technically allow foreign access to their domestic legal services markets through foreign
legal consultants have stringent requirements, reminiscent of Korea’s historical barriers
discussed infra Part III.A, that still effectively exclude foreign attorneys and firms from
practicing within their borders. One surprising example is India. See Arno L. Eisen, Legal
Services in India: Is There an Obligation Under the GATS or Are There Policy Reasons for
India to Open Its Legal Services Market to Foreign Legal Consultants?, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL
L. & BUS. 273 (2012).
45
Song, supra note 31, at 10.
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also faced limitations in their ability to represent Korean and international
clients in the country.46 To stay within the law, foreign attorneys have been
operating their “Korea practices” out of their Hong Kong or Tokyo
offices,47 which have been equipped to handle Korean-related legal work
from outside Korea’s borders.48 For decades, these attorneys have traveled
on three-hour flights, doing much of their business in Seoul hotel rooms. 49
Now, these same attorneys and law firms may continue their work
involving Korean matters from offices located in Korea, and in the future,
in joint ventures50 with Korean law firms while employing Korean
attorneys. The KORUS FTA, as the final necessary ingredient for the
official opening of Korea’s legal market, has thus been long awaited and
expected.51 It was never a question of if Korea would reach agreement with
the United States, but when.52
A. Historical Protectionism and Anti-Competitive Practices
Korea has traditionally applied restrictive business practices to protect
its domestic services market at large, practices which have been regarded by
other countries as trade barriers hampering flow of trade and fair
competition.53 Valuing self-sufficiency and historically antipathetic to
foreign influence, Korea earned the title of “Hermit Kingdom” in the 19th
century.54 During Korea’s period of economic growth and development
between the 1960s and 1990s, the Korean government had much more
direct and positive involvement than the governments of other Asian
countries; it made major decisions to manage the country’s economy, and
46

Quarterly Updates, CORP. COUNS. Q., Oct. 2009, at 681, 718–19.
Rachel Brash & Roger Parloff, A World of Lawyers: Asia, Australia, and the Pacific
Rim, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 50, 63.
48
Misasha Suzuki, Note, The Protectionist Bar Against Foreign Lawyers in Japan,
China, and Korea: Domestic Control in the Face of Internationalization, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 385, 404 (2003).
49
Elizabeth Goldberg, Closed Society, AM. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 113, 113.
50
“Joint ventures” refer to the business association under the third stage of the KORUS
FTA legal market liberalization, where foreign and Korean law firms will be able to employ
Korean attorneys and establish voting shares or equity interests. See Free Trade Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor. Annex II,
June
30,
2007,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter KORUS FTA Annex II]; see also discussion
infra Part III.C.
51
See Sean C. Hayes, The KORUS FTA Will Pass: Don’t Hold Your Breath, KOR. L.
BLOG (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.thekoreanlawblog.com/2011/08/korus-fta-will-pass.html.
52
Goldberg, supra note 49 (citing Jeong-ho Roh, director of the Center for Korean Legal
Studies at Columbia University).
53
Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practice as Trade Barriers Used By Korea and Japan:
Focusing on Service and Investment Markets, 16 BOND L. REV. 117, 118 (2004).
54
See Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22.
47
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this custom carried the day through the 21st century.55 Korea has had a
history of restricting foreign participation in various industries, including
advertising, film, engineering, construction, and the legal services market.56
While many of these industries were liberalized after the 1990s, the Korean
government still found reason to restrict domestic access to foreign
attorneys.57 It cited reasons commonly given by countries around the
world, including the “infant industry” theory—the fear that foreign lawyers
and firms would overwhelm local firms and stifle the development of the
local bar.58
Specifically, the Korean Attorney-at-Law Act59 has always protected
the Korean legal market through extremely rigorous educational
requirements.60 In 1996, while the Act was revised61 to theoretically allow
foreigners to practice in Korea by abolishing a rule that restricted legal
practice to Korean nationals, by even a decade later, no foreign attorney had
been authorized by the Ministry of Justice to practice as a lawyer.62
Impossible educational requirements included passing an exam offered only
in Korean, which, for at least four decades, yielded annual pass rates
ranging from less than 5% at best and around 0.25% at worst.63 Thereafter,
55
Lee, supra note 53, at 141. Korea is well-known for its chaebols, large Korean
business conglomerates that were historically family-owned and spurred on by aggressive
governmental support and finance. For a more comprehensive history of the formation of
Korean chaebols and their significant contribution to Korea’s early economic growth, see
MYONG HUN KANG, THE KOREAN BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE: CHAEBOL THEN AND NOW
(1996); RICHARD M. STEERS ET AL., THE CHAEBOL: KOREA’S NEW INDUSTRIAL MIGHT
(1989).
56
Lee, supra note 53, at 143–44.
57
Id. at 145–46 n.162.
58
Id.; see also Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International
Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 941, 952–53(1995) (proposing four
other reasons for host countries to restrict access to foreign attorneys, including: (1) lack of
national loyalty and shared cultural values; (2) lack of necessary competence to practice
domestic law; (3) inability to redress injury to citizens by foreign attorneys; and (4) lack of
reciprocal access to foreign legal markets).
59
Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949 (S. Kor.).
60
See Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06.
61
Attorney-at-Law Act, amended by Act No. 5177, June 30, 1996 (S. Kor.).
62
Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06.
63
Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An Analysis of South Korea’s Implementation of
the American Law School Model, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 322, 337–38 (2009); see also
Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application to the Japanese
and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 295, 336 (2010). For a look into a
particular individual’s attempt to pass the exam, see John M. Glionna, Seoul’s Intellectual
Pressure
Cooker,
L.A.
TIMES,
Aug.
21,
2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/world/la-fg-south-korea-exam-village-20110822
(after giving up on passing the exam, Park Jin-hun still dreams about whether he could do it,
thirteen years after first trying).
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the Act limited licensing of attorneys to individuals who completed a twoyear training course offered solely through the Judicial Training and
Research Institute (JTRI).64 Regulating entry in this manner through
compliance requirements with technical qualifications, rather than expressly
restricting entry, was an effective move65 made by countries faced with
continuing domestic policy concerns for maintaining the quality of the
profession66 even after the adoption of more formal commitments to market
liberalization.67
B. Setting the Policy of the General Agreement on Trade in Services in
Motion
Various forms of trade agreements include bilateral investment
treaties, which generally help protect private investment, agreements under
the World Trade Organization (WTO),68 and FTAs, which can be between
two or multiple states.69 An FTA generally reduces barriers to exports of
products and services between trading parties to the FTA, such as by
eliminating or reducing tariffs and quotas.70 While major global trade
agreements have covered “goods” for more than sixty years, “services”
have been covered by international agreements for less than twenty.71 As
the share of services in international trade steadily increased, efforts to
regulate that trade culminated in the adoption of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) in 1994.72 In 1995—the year before Korea

64

Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06.
Dai-kwon Choi, Korea. A Legal Profession in Transformation: The Korean
Experience, in Reorganisation and Resistance: Legal Professions Confront a Changing
World 171, 176 (William L.F. Felstiner, ed., 2005).
66
Lee, supra note 53, at 125.
67
See supra note 44.
68
The World Trade Organization deals with regulation of trade between participating
countries, providing a forum or framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements.
See What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
69
Trade Agreements, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
70
Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Sept.
4, 2012).
71
Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC: The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal
Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 878 (2010).
72
The GATS was a product of the WTO’s Uruguay Round on trade based on the view
that technical and regulatory innovations enhanced the “tradability of services,” and it
applies to all service sectors except those “supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority,” such as health and education, and air transport services. For the full text of the
GATS, see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1B,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 283, available at http://wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS Annex 1B].
65
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theoretically allowed foreign attorneys to practice within its borders through
its amendment to the Attorney-at-Law Act73—Korea joined the WTO.74
Under the newly minted GATS, Korea, as a member government, was
committed to engage in negotiations with other WTO members to
progressively liberalize trade not only in goods, but also in services.75
Heightening awareness of services internationally,76 GATS inspired a new
generation of regional trade agreements.77 These trade agreements address
a broad range of services, including transportation, finance, legal,
construction, telecommunications, and environmental78—industries that
Korea historically restricted.79 Korea concluded its first FTA with Chile in
2002,80 and almost twelve years after committing itself to negotiating trade
regulations with other WTO countries, informally signed the KORUS FTA
in 2007.81 With high hopes in the spirit of GATS policy, the KORUS FTA
is projected to generate billions of dollars in increased trade and investment
in a wide-range of goods and services between Korea and the United
States.82
C. The Foreign Legal Consultant Act and the KORUS FTA
As a result of the Korean government’s efforts to satisfy its obligations
under the KORUS FTA,83 and before the FTA’s formal ratification by both
governments, Korea’s Ministry of Justice passed the Foreign Legal
Consultant Act (FLCA) in March 2009.84 The FLCA is the statutory
mechanism that specifies which foreign lawyers and firms may work in
Korea.85 It also invalidates Article 109 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, which
73
Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949, amended by Act
No. 5177, June 30, 1996 (S. Kor.).
74
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
75
GATS Annex 1B, supra note 72, art. XIX.
76
Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stephenson, Services Trade: Past Liberalization and Future
Challenges, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 612 (2007).
77
Id. at 618–21.
78
COOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 16.
79
See Lee, supra note 53, at 143–44.
80
See Hae-kwan Chung, The Korea-Chile FTA: Significance and Implications, E. ASIAN
REV., Spring 2003, at 71, 71.
81
See MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
82
See Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22.
83
See Kyungho Choi, Korean Foreign Legal Consultants Act: Legal Profession of
American Lawyers in South Korea, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 100, 102 (2010).
84
Id. at 101.
85
For more information regarding the registration and requirements of foreign legal
consultants and foreign legal offices, as well as sources on Korean regulations, see Foreign
Legal Consultant (FLC), KOR. B. ASS’N, http://www.koreanbar.or.kr/eng/sub/sub04_01.asp
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
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prohibited foreign attorneys from an unauthorized practice of law.86 Article
1 of the FLCA declares that the Act’s purpose is to establish prerequisites to
qualify, register, and allow a foreign legal consultant (FLC) to work in
Korea.87 In general, a registered FLC is a practicing attorney in good
standing in an eligible foreign country.88 An eligible foreign country is one
that has an existing FTA with Korea, ratified by both countries.89 Thus,
despite the enactment of the FLCA in 2009, it was not until November 2011
after the KORUS FTA was ratified by both the United States and Korea that
U.S. lawyers and law firms could benefit from the provisions of either the
KORUS FTA or FLCA.90
Under the KORUS FTA, lawyers and law firms will enter the Korean
legal services market in three stages.91 First, U.S. law firms may establish
branch offices in Korea.92 U.S. attorneys may also provide legal advisory
services on U.S. and public international law, but not domestic law.93 This
first stage focuses on allowing foreign individuals to transact business in
Korea.94 Second, in 2014, Korean and foreign law firms will be able to
collaborate in matters where domestic and foreign legal issues are mixed,
and share profits realized from such collaboration.95 This stage focuses on
greater integration by foreign law firms.96 In the third stage, estimated to
take place around 2017, foreign law firms will be able to enter into joint
ventures with Korean law firms, as well as directly employ Korean legal
professionals.97 This last stage envisions the fullest integration of foreign
legal professionals in Korea, and the creation of international law firms.98
The market will not be an open free-for-all for any FLC to establish a
practice, however, and foreign attorneys will still be constrained in other
ways.99 As a preliminary matter, the FLCA provides for certain
86

Choi, supra note 83, at 101.
Waegukbeobjamunsahbeob [Foreign Legal Consultant Act], Act No. 9524, Mar. 25,
2009 (S. Kor.).
88
Id. art. 2.
89
Id. art. 6(1)1.
90
See Choi, supra note 83, at 102.
91
See KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45. Note that this model is not unique
to the United States, but is also used, for example, in the KOREU FTA, and while the
discussion here uses “U.S.” attorneys and firms, the same schedule generally applies to
attorneys and firms of other countries with whom Korea has an FTA. See sources cited
supra note 31 (liberalization with the EU).
92
KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45.
93
Id.
94
Choi, supra note 83, at 103.
95
KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45.
96
Choi, supra note 83, at 103.
97
KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45.
98
Choi, supra note 83, at 103.
99
See Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Korea Passes Foreign Legal
87
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qualifications, including licensing and minimum practical experience
requirements.100 Also, as the title “consultant” suggests, no foreign attorney
may autonomously represent clients in Korean courtrooms or be selfemployed, but must work with some established firm, whether Korean or
foreign.101 While these foreign attorneys may maintain their titles as known
in their home jurisdictions, such as “attorney at law,” and also use the
Korean word for “lawyer”—or byeonhosa—they must still always present
themselves to the public as FLCs.102 These kinds of details indicate the
research and deliberation that have gone into completing Korea’s agreement
to finally open its legal services market.103
IV. A LOOK BACKWARD: THE LEGAL MARKETS OF GERMANY
AND JAPAN
To robustly forecast the effects of Korea’s legal services market
liberalization, a look back to prior foreign entry into the legal markets of
Germany and Japan is indispensable. Although foreign firms have entered
both German and Japanese legal services markets, the various legal players
have also paved different paths in the two countries—differences that
provide guideposts to the likely success of Korea’s future legal market.
A. Germany: Not Merely a Story of Large Foreign Law Firms104
While a discussion of a country on another continent may seem
inappropriate for an exposition on Korea at first glance, Germany has often
Consultant Act, Opening the Country’s Legal Service Market to Law Firms in Foreign
Countries that are Parties to Effective Free Trade Agreements with Korea, ANTITRUST L.
BLOG
(Apr.
13,
2009,
2:40
PM),
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2009/04/articles/article/korea-passes-foreign-legalconsultant-act-opening-the-countrys-legal-service-market-to-law-firms-in-foreign-countriesthat-are-parties-to-effective-free-trade-agreements-with-korea/.
100
See infra notes 359–67 and accompanying text.
101
Park, supra note 5.
102
Waegukbeobjamunsahbeob [Foreign Legal Consultant Act], Act No. 9524, Mar. 25,
2009, art. 27(1) (S. Kor.).
103
Foreign law firms in Japan, for example, were initially prohibited from using their
official “brand names,” which “has become a crucial element in determining and securing
the value of a law firm” in any foreign jurisdiction. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The
Role of Elite Law Firms in International Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 35, 66 (2007); see also infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
104
The discussion that follows is one that focuses on a very limited timeframe in recent
years and does not look into pre-1980 history of the legal profession in Germany. This older
history, however, is a very interesting topic, notably surrounding the changes of the
profession from before and after Adolf Hitler’s rule in Germany. While sources on the topic
are myriad, the author suggests MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES
ON LEGAL HISTORY IN NAZI GERMANY (Thomas Dunlap, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998)
for one perspective on the legal profession through Nazi Germany in particular.
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been cited in Korea and other East Asian countries105 as the gloomy
example of foreign infiltration and domination in domestic legal services
markets.106 Before the KORUS FTA was first signed, an article in The
Korea Times107 analyzed this common reference, noting generally that
“[d]oomsayers point to the case of Germany, which saw eight of its top ten
law firms taken over by larger British competitors just more than a decade
after opening its legal services market.”108 One scholar, upon studying
large law firms in Germany, has suggested that developments in Germany
may serve as an exemplar of what will happen in the legal markets of
liberalizing countries, including Korea.109
To clarify the flawed
comparisons between Korean and German legal markets and the
unwarranted resulting fallacies in Part V, this subpart provides an overview
of: (1) the legal education system in Germany, which is now distinct from
the systems of Japan110 and Korea;111 (2) the growth of German law firms
coupled with foreign entry112 into the German legal services market; and (3)
the German legal market’s current structure.
1. Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession
The largest and most successful of large law firms in Germany are
U.K.-based, but this fact paints a very one-sided picture of the German legal
services market, which begins, as it does anywhere, with a legal education.
German students begin their legal studies in university, directly out of high
school.113 There is no admission test for students who intend to pursue law,
and they can generally choose the law faculty they want to attend.114
During the course of their university studies, students take several exams in

105
See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition:
Is Bigger Really Better? An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 821
(2007) (discussing Japan).
106
See Goldberg, supra note 49.
107
The Korea Times is Korea’s first and oldest newspaper providing daily publications in
English. See generally KOR. TIMES, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 16, 2012).
108
Tong-hyung Kim, “U.S. Invasion” Not Likely in Korean Law Market, KOR. TIMES
(Apr.
15,
2007
10:42
PM),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/05/206_837.html.
109
Christoph Luschin, Large Law Firms in Germany, 14 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 26, 29
(2010).
110
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
111
See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
112
Because both the popular perception in Asia and reality of the German legal market
reflect the success of large law firms from the U.K. and United States, this subpart focuses
on the history of the legal profession from those two countries in Germany.
113
Stefan Korioth, Legal Education in Germany Today, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 85, 90 (2006).
114
Id.
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various areas of the law, receiving certificates for passing each.115 These
certificates are required for the next step, a state bar exam administered in
two stages.116 The first exam covers the academic knowledge acquired
during all of the previous years spent in university.117 Students are
evaluated by a mix of professors and practitioners, and about 70% of testers
pass.118 Between the first and second exam, students go through a
compulsory two-year period of training through practical internships.119
Thereafter, the second exam aims at testing the practical skills acquired in
training, and is evaluated only by practitioners; about 85% of students make
it past this second exam annually.120
Germany has generally not faced concerns regarding an under-supply
of legal professionals.121 The recruitment pool for large law firms and inhouse legal departments of very large corporations in Germany, however, is
still quite small each year. While the German legal education journey
consumes at least six years, large employers ultimately look primarily at
high performance on the two bar exams alone, as opposed to grades, law
school rankings, or relevant experience.122 Moreover, with a historical
commitment to producing jurists, a legal education has been regarded “as
the best general education available in Germany,” and many lawyers do not
pursue specific legal professions.123 Consequently, most law school
graduates end up in small private legal partnerships, journalism, or
politics.124
2. Merger Mania
The recruitment pool for large law firms in Germany is also small
because the market share of those firms within the domestic German legal

115

Id. at 94.
Id.
117
LARS GEROLD, OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY 9 (2008), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/36304.
118
Korioth, supra note 113, at 94.
119
Id. at 97.
120
GEROLD, supra note 117, at 10.
121
Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese Law School System Was Established: CoOptation as a Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressures, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
365, 366, 378 n.25 (2009).
122
E.g., Carole Silver, The Variable Value of U.S. Legal Education in the Global Legal
Services Market, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 26–27 (quoting an LL.M. graduate working in
a U.S.-based firm in Germany who explained that his placement in the top two percent of the
German grade scale on the second state examination was the major reason for his job offers).
123
Rainer Grote, Comparative Law and Teaching Law Through the Case Method in the
Civil Law Tradition—A German Perspective, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 170, 174
(2005).
124
Silver, supra note 122.
116
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services market remains small. The growth of large law firms in Germany
began in 1989, when domestic and foreign large law firms alike were first
“allowed” in Germany.125 Historically, German law specifically limited
German lawyers and law firms to practicing in only one German
jurisdiction.126 Consequently, the traditional German legal market was
exclusively in the hands of sophisticated solo practitioners, small
partnerships, in-house counsel, or civil servants, but not in any large law
firm.127 The biggest small partnerships had at most ten to twenty
attorneys.128 In fact, German lawyers today refer only to Kanzlei, literally
meaning chambers or office, and Großkanzlei, which are simply larger
Kanzlei; German lawyers have yet to adopt into their jargon, however, a
term that directly translates to “law firm.”129
Beginning in 1989, with the overturning of the law prohibiting legal
professionals from operating in more than one jurisdiction,130 the German
legal market began to change rapidly.131 With the new ability to have a
national presence, local offices began to grow.132 Simultaneously, the
1990s saw the dot-com boom,133 the introduction of the Euro,134 and a
unified European market under the birth of the EU.135 Nearby, law firms in
125

See Susanne Lace, Mergers, Mergers Everywhere: Constructing the Global Law Firm
in Germany, in LEGAL PROFESSIONS: WORK, STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 51, 54–55
(Jerry Van Hoy ed., 2001).
126
Martin Henssler & Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers—A View From
Germany, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 269, 274 (2001) (citing Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung [BRAO]
[Federal Lawyers’ Act], Jan. 8, 1959, BGBL. I at 2515, as amended, § 59 (Ger.)).
127
See id. at 275.
128
Ulrike Schultz, Germany. Regulated Deregulations: The Case of the German Legal
Profession, in REORGANISATION AND RESISTANCE: LEGAL PROFESSIONS CONFRONT A
CHANGING WORLD 93, 120 (William L.F. Felstiner ed., 2005).
129
Luschin, supra note 109, at 30 n.4. For the remainder of this Comment, however, I
still use the word “firm” to signify a legal practice spanning one or more offices, including in
the German context, unless clarity requires otherwise.
130
Henssler & Terry, supra note 126.
131
See Germany: Law Firms and Multinational Partnerships Easier Admission
Procedures for Non-German Lawyers to the German Bar, MONDAQ § 4 (Jan. 20, 2000),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=8149.
132
Id.
133
Definition
of
dot-com
bubble,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Dot+com+boom (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
(“Refers to the late 1990s during which countless Internet companies were riding an
enormous wave of enthusiasm that pushed their stock valuations into the stratosphere even
though they never made a penny. Billions in venture capital were given to entrepreneurs
with little or no experience to fund ideas that were ludicrous. It was a crazy time, and people
were very excited.”).
134
See
generally
History
of
the
Euro,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/business/2001/euro_cash/history/default.stm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
135
See generally The History of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
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the U.K. had been expanding concurrently with the rapid development of
financial and capital markets.136 With eyes looking to Germany as home to
a new global financial hub, many U.K. firms established German offices,
especially in the country’s growing financial center of Frankfurt am
Main.137 The nascent national German firms quickly began to make plans
to bulk up in competition with their foreign counterparts.138 That these
domestic firms had to compete globally with the major U.K.-based
international firms became a common perception,139 an outlook that
survives and haunts members of Korean society today. 140 Many national
German firms, formed just recently, previously had no global ambitions or
strategy but found themselves vying for a foreign counterpart with which
they could merge into a large, international firm in order to compete on a
global or at least a supra-regional basis.141 Both U.K. and German firms
feared that, with the limited number of desirable partners on each side, they
“might be left empty-handed in a game of musical chairs once the music
stopped.”142 The ensuing merger mania—the herd mentality143 stemming
from the fear on both sides of being left behind at a time of rapidly
changing market conditions144—pushed German and foreign law firms to
merge and form large partnerships.
After the U.K. firms entered the German market through large-scale
mergers, U.S. firms looking to be competitive in a globally expanding legal
services market145 began to flock to Germany in the mid-1990s,146 but with
eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
136
Flood, supra note 103, at 42–48.
137
Henssler & Terry, supra note 126, at 272–79. Under a December 1989 amendment to
the German federal law regulating attorneys, foreign firms and lawyers both from and
outside the EU were also permitted to practice in Germany, subject to certain restrictions.
SYDNEY M. CONE, III, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES 11:6–11:17 (1996).
138
See Eric L. Martin, Note, Liberalization and Cravathism: How Liberalization
Triggered the Reorganization of the Legal Profession in Germany and Japan, 43 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 169, 184–85 (2007).
139
See Larry Smith, Influx of American Firms Forces Radical Changes in German Legal
Market, OF COUNSEL, Nov. 7, 1994, at 12, 16–17.
140
See Domestic Law Firms Face Tough Competition, supra note 15.
141
Aronson, supra note 105, at 804.
142
Id. at 803.
143
Luschin, supra note 109, at 42.
144
Analyzing the difference in attorney density between East and West Germany, one
scholar has suggested a connection between lawyers in a geographical area and the area’s
level of maturity in finance and industry. He argues that West German firms in cities such as
Frankfurt, Munich, and Dusseldorf, began to handle the larger, more profitable commercial
work while East German attorneys gravitated towards areas such as family and labor law.
See id. at 38–40.
145
See Marc J. Bartel & Bradford W. Hildebrandt, Memo to Managing Partners: Start
Worrying About Europe, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 69 (warning U.S. firms that “European
firms [would] soon be [their] direct competitor[s], or at least a potential partner,” as well as
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a different strategy. Because the U.S. firms landed in Germany years into
the merger game, most of the largest German law firms had through their
mergers already committed to U.K. firms.147 Moreover, many remaining
German firms resisted the merger wave and sought to be independent.148
These resisting firms instead established their own international brand,
formed informal alliances with foreign law firms, became focused
boutiques, or concentrated on developing a regional presence—and they
were successful.149 Consequently, U.S. firms tended to merge with smaller
partners or set up small offices of their own.150 Many also strategized by
simply recruiting key local attorneys.151
At the same time, U.S. firms also had less incentive than their U.K.
counterparts to establish large practices in Germany. U.K. firms were much
more likely to have a significant German practice, in line with a natural
desire to dominate their regional Eurocentric market.152 U.K. firms also did
not enjoy a similar substantial domestic legal market to that of the United
States, and have historically been more internationally focused.153
Freshfields Bruckhaus & Deringer (Freshfields), for example, the U.K. firm
with the most foreign attorneys in Germany, employs its German practice
with 25% of its overall global workforce.154 Similarly, the U.K.’s two
largest grossing law firms by revenue have stationed one-tenth of their
entire global workforce in Germany.155 Other Euro-friendly setups also
made a German practice easier to attain for U.K.- than U.S.-trained
attorneys. EU-licensed attorneys, for example, can practice German law as

advising that the time for firms in the United States and Europe to start getting serious with
each other was “now” because the few European firms “[wouldn’t] be independent or
unaligned forever,” and that the “[f]irms that [did] not understand what [was] happening
overseas [would] see the European train pass them by”).
146
See Smith, supra note 139, at 12–13.
147
See Luschin, supra note 109, at 56.
148
John Flood & Fabian Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms, and the Stabilization of
Transnational Business, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 489, 507–08 (2008).
149
See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
150
See Henssler & Terry, supra note 126, at 276–79.
151
Silver, supra note 122.
152
See Henssler & Terry, supra note 126, at 277.
153
Lace, supra note 125, at 53.
154
Luschin, supra note 109, at 45–46; Brenda Sandburg, They’ll Take “Meinhattan”,
AM. LAW., May 2006, at 196, 198. This is largely also a product of the merger mania,
Freshfields itself being a merger between London-based Freshfields, and German-based
Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund and Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Lober. Heather
Smith, Race to the Top, AM. LAW., May 2005, at 118, 119. Bruckhaus Westrick Heller
Lober, a product of a German firm absorbing an Austrian firm, was the largest German firm
prior to its joining Freshfields. John E. Morris, A World of Lawyers, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998,
at 50, 63.
155
Luschin, supra note 109, at 47, 49.
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long as they re-qualify by taking an exam.156 U.S.-qualified attorneys, on
the other hand, must either undertake a six-year German legal education157
to enjoy the full benefits of bar admission, or skip such qualification and
limit their practice to advising on U.S. or international law.158 The latter
route is more attractive to U.S. attorneys for various reasons, and most work
by U.S. firms in Germany was and is U.S.-focused, concentrating on U.S.
law either for U.S. businesses abroad or for foreign businesses with
interests in the United States.159
Presently, while both U.K. and U.S. law firms are highly regarded in
Germany by clients and the legal community, U.K. firms have undoubtedly
topped the ranks of large law firms in Germany both in business and
prestige.160
3. The Current Legal Market: A Market Predominantly of Small Practices
Notwithstanding the success of foreign firms, the number of German
attorneys actually employed by any large law firm in Germany, whether
German or foreign, is a small minority (less than 10%), and of that number,
the number of attorneys working at the largest U.K. and U.S. law firms is
yet another small fraction.161 This is true in spite of the fact that foreign law
firms themselves are mostly staffed with German attorneys who earned
their primary legal education in Germany.162 An overwhelming majority of
German attorneys therefore work in the smaller settings of solo practices or
in local partnerships.163 Through strategies such as formal or informal
156
The exam is, in practice, not as difficult as the regular German bar exam, and upon
passing, an attorney is admitted to the German local bar association, becoming fully
integrated as a German attorney without having to refer to his education abroad. See Ronald
C. King, Foreign Lawyers in Foreign Jurisdictions: Rights of Practice and Establishment,
63 DEF. COUNS. J. 363, 369–71 (1996) for details on the statutory mechanisms, including the
German Bar Admission Act and the Treaty of Rome, which govern cross-border legal
services in Germany. The law governing the practice of nationals of EU member states is
the Gesetz über die Tätigkeit europäischer Rechtsanwälte in Deutschland, or EuRAG. For
an English version of the law, see Law Implementing the Directives of the European
Community Pertaining to the Professional Law Regulating the Legal Profession, Mar. 9,
2000, Federal Law Gazette art. 1 (Ger.).
157
See infra Part IV.A.1.
158
See Henssler & Terry, supra note 126, at 285, 288.
159
Carole Silver, Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 67, 75–76 (2007).
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JUVE, a German legal magazine, published a 2011 national review of the top fifty
firms in Germany, for example, that were led by five U.K. firms, six U.S. firms, and four
German firms. Ranking, JUVE, http://www.juve.de/handbuch/en/2012/ranking/2 (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
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Silver, supra note 122, at 23–24.
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referral networks or alliances,164 firms in Frankfurt, for example, are led by
lawyers educated in Germany, who offer advice on local law, and limit their
business ties within borders.165 Domestic German law firms, whose
employees are mostly German and whose advice is mostly on German law,
have not merely survived, but thrive and adapt in re-emerging old firms,
new independent firms, and new international startups.166
Furthermore, entry into Germany has not been rosy for all foreign law
firms. A common scenario amidst the merger crazes involved internal
splits within the German firm scheduled for merger.167 Senior associates
and partners fled to form their own new boutiques168 based on the idea that
attorneys wanted to work more closely with clients.169 It also took fifteen
years for one of today’s leading U.S. law firms to make it to the top,
landing the lead in Germany’s biggest M&A deal of the year in 2006 after
being replaced as lead counsel for a prominent merger eight years prior.170
The same year, the editor of the German legal magazine JUVE spotlighted
the market for Mittelstand, or family-owned midsize industrial companies
in Germany, which were internationally active and preferred smaller
firms.171 A large workforce plus a foreign headquarters thus did not
necessarily equate to automatic victory for a law firm in the German legal
market.
The continued success of German firms in Germany also lies in the
fact that many foreign firms are much more concentrated in legal fields that
have been deemed strategically important.172 Although U.K. firms in
Germany maintain their full-service shops, U.S. firms continue to be more
narrowly focused on specific areas of law, such as transactional work.173
practitioners generate 61.6% of total revenue of the legal services sector, and employ 97.1%
of the entire legal workforce in Germany, where “middle” is defined as a firm with ten to
nineteen employees).
164
Smith, supra note 139, at 18.
165
Silver, supra note 159, at 88.
166
See Ravinder Casley Gera, Is Germany Turning Its Back on International Firms?,
CHAMBERS MAG., 2011, available at http://www.chambersmagazine.co.uk/Article/IsGermany-turning-its-back-on-international-firms.
167
See id.
168
Schultz, supra note 128, at 122.
169
See Sandburg, supra note 154.
170
Id. at 196 (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP).
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See Lace, supra note 125, at 65–66.
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See, e.g., Frankfurt: Recruiting, SKADDEN, ARPS SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP &
AFFILIATES,
http://www.skadden.com/printFriendly.cfm?print=1&contentID=49&officeID=6 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012) (the office focuses “on advising in complex M&A, capital markets . . . and
financing
transactions”);
Germany,
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Moreover, in light of the recent recession, full-service firms have been
considering whether to retain all their services or to slough some fat and
focus on certain practice areas.174 The need for a team of established
German lawyers also was and still remains the key to success for these
firms.175
While large law firms in Germany may be overshadowed by a few
mega foreign law firms, even the largest law firms are primarily staffed
with German attorneys. Moreover, the vast majority of German attorneys
maintain successful smaller practices, from solo practices to full-service
firms. In contrast, the large, foreign international firms have increasingly
preferred practicing in only certain specialized areas of international private
law, continuing to leave much legal practice to local attorneys. The picture
of the merger mania among large law firms is thus an extremely incomplete
portrayal of the overall German legal market, which foreign firms have not
and do not dominate.
B. Japan: Korea’s Precursor
Shifting gears to a country that begs mention in an analysis of Korea’s
legal market liberalization, this Comment turns to Japan’s legal market as a
remarkable case study. Japan and Korea share a long, albeit not always
friendly, history, and many similar cultural values and concerns.176 The
following analysis of Japan will seem in some, but not all, respects like a
mirror image of that of Korea. This is true, in part, because Korea has
modeled the current opening of its market after Japan’s experiences with its
legal market since the 1980s.177 Its forerunner by nearly a decade and a
half, Japan’s past and current legal market is very relevant to making
predictions about Korea’s current liberalization, not only by analyzing
similarities between the two, but also by noting where the two diverge.
This subpart first provides a summary of Japan’s historically closed legal
services market, overviews its legal education reform, and ends with a look
e16295bf21d1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dcb3cae1-b888-42f7-bbe91fddd2b057d7/A4_Germany.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (beginning the advertisement
by highlighting the office’s experience in “cross-border acquisitions and joint ventures,
corporate finance and securities matters, as well as private equity and venture capital”);
Offices,
KIRKLAND
&
ELLIS
INTERNATIONAL
LLP,
http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=234&itemid=53&section=0&displaymo
re=1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (the firm’s “practice in Munich focuses on private equity
and M&A, banking and finance, international tax, and financial restructuring”).
174
See Luschin, supra note 109, at 90–91.
175
See Sandburg, supra note 154, at 196.
176
See Choi, supra note 65, at 173.
177
See Peter Kim Has Taken Up the Position as President of South Korea’s Bar
Association as the Country Becomes Increasingly Influential in a Fast Changing World, 64
NO. 1 INT’L B. NEWS 50, 52 (2010) [hereinafter Peter Kim].
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at the current symbiotic relationship between domestic and foreign law
firms.
1. Historical Protectionism Followed by Internal Merger Mania
The roots of protectionism in Japan lay in a historical cultural stigma
against the rule of law and lawyers in Japanese society.178 The Japanese
government, Japanese industries, and Japanese attorneys kept the legal
community in Japan small, and liked it that way.179 Japanese businesses
feared the emergence of American-style litigation, legal expenses, and large
damage awards; the Japanese legal community sought to restrict
competition by limiting the number of attorneys in its domestic monopoly
and keeping foreign attorneys out.180
However, from the 1980s to the 1990s, Japan, like many East Asian
countries, underwent massive liberalization of its economy,181 and an
opening to its legal services market followed suit. In liberalizing its legal
market, Japan took a number of baby steps over the course of about two
decades. Over lingering concerns of professional autonomy and the proper
social role of attorneys,182 Japan first formally allowed foreign attorneys to
practice in Japan in 1986, under the Special Measures Law Concerning
Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Attorneys, commonly known as
Law 66.183 Law 66, however, still prohibited foreign lawyers and firms
from employing or forming partnerships with Japanese attorneys, or using
official firm names.184 In short, the law allowed foreign attorneys in Japan
to “practice” the law of their home jurisdiction.185
An amendment to Law 66 in 1994 subsequently allowed law firms to
ally with Japanese firms in “specific joint enterprises” that could employ
both foreign and Japanese attorneys.186 Previously, foreign firms had been
forced to engage in business under the name of an individual senior partner
who registered under the law, but after the 1994 amendment, were also
allowed to use their official firm names.187 Foreign firms were still
178

Benno Heussen, Commentaries on Papers from the German Perspective, in LAWYERS’
PRACTICE & IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 241, 242 (Jane J. Barcelo III & Roger C.
Cramton eds., 1999).
179
See R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 294–95 (2002).
180
Id.
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Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 179, at 299.
182
CONE, supra note 137, at 13:1–13:2.
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Chapman & Tauber, supra note 58, at 960–61.
184
CONE, supra note 137, at 13:13–13:14; Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 179, at 300.
185
See Chapman & Tauber, supra note 58, at 960–61.
186
Leonardo Ciano & Drew Martin, The Foreign Lawyer Law of Japan: Legitimate
Complaints or Red Herrings?, 76 J. INQUIRY & RES. 121, 123 (2002).
187
Id.
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prohibited, however, from hiring Japanese attorneys directly or
independently of a partnership with a Japanese law firm. 188 An amendment
just two years later in 1996 further allowed foreign attorneys to represent
clients in international arbitrations in Japan.189
One impetus behind these increased openings in Japan involved
financial deregulation and an increase in foreign direct investment over the
1990s.190 The increase of complex corporate matters slowly heightened
recognition of the importance of legal services in addressing new business
risks and opportunities, leading business leaders to demand greater and
better business attorneys.191 Increasing demand for corporate legal services,
rising popularity of large corporate law firms, growing recognition of the
importance of both law and lawyers, and increasing competition among
firms to recruit highly qualified attorneys led Japanese law firms to grow
and merge with each other.192 Before most foreign firms even entered the
fray in the early 2000s, mid-size Japanese firms were first losing good
associates to elite Japanese firms.193 They then lost associates to the foreign
joint enterprise firms that had been slowly growing since the passing of the
1994 amendment to Law 66.194 The end of this period of mergers resulted
in the elite “Big Four”195 large corporate Japanese law firms.196 Unlike the
local firms in Germany that rapidly and almost contemporaneously bulked
up with both each other and foreign law firms entering the open market in
mass numbers,197 Japanese firms grew slowly and mostly only amongst
themselves.198
The reasons given for the mergers were common ones, and included
the need to meet client demands for greater expertise and the ability to
provide sufficient resources to handle large complex matters.199 There was
little direct evidence, however, that clients ever truly made such demands,
188

CONE, supra note 137, at 13:22.
Ciano & Martin, supra note 186, at 123.
190
See Martin, supra note 138, at 191 & n.200, 192.
191
See id. at 192.
192
See Aronson, supra note 105, at 817–18.
193
Id. at 816.
194
Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan: Proceedings of a
Panel Discussion on the Growth of Corporate Law Firms and the Role of Lawyers in Japan,
21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 45, 68 (2007) (the panel included attorneys from small and large
Japanese firms, as well as attorneys from Jones Day and Linklaters LLP).
195
Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu; Nishimura & Asahi; Anderson Mori & Tomotsune;
and Mori Hamada & Matsumoto. Anthony Lin, Sidelined, ASIAN LAW., Winter 2012, at 18,
22.
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Martin, supra note 138, at 193–94.
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See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
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Martin, supra note 138, at 193–94 (describing internal Japanese mergers between
1985 and 2005).
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Aronson, supra note 194, at 61–63.
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but there is at least anecdotal evidence that attorneys feared losing client
business if they fell behind other local or joint enterprise firms. 200
Consequently, one scholar has suggested a more robust explanation behind
the internal merger mania in Japan that focuses on consideration of
perceived reputational competition.201
By 2003, Japanese parliament had passed a law that allowed for full
integration between foreign and Japanese law firms beginning in 2005.202
As a result, some took full advantage of the liberalization, and instituted
immediate mergers, most notably, the Japanese firm Mitsui, Yasuda, Wani
& Maeda, and the U.K.-originating firm Linklaters LLP.203 Others were
happy with maintaining their joint enterprises204 or just changing their
names.205 However, because the growing domestic legal services market
had relatively few players by then, the elite Japanese firms that led it were
happy to maintain their status and were reluctant to engage in international
mergers with foreign firms.206 A survey done around the passing of this
final 2003 legislation also showed that Japanese companies still desired
Japanese lawyers.207 Overall, there seemed to be consensus that Japanese
attorneys had skills that their foreign counterparts lacked, and that access to
native attorneys was important.208
2. Legal Education Reform
In the spirit of increasing liberalization, Japan also implemented
comprehensive legal education reform intended to produce more attorneys
and help increase the rule of law in Japanese society.209 Prior to 2004, the
Japanese system of legal education mirrored the German system from
which it was deliberately adapted.210 Students in Japan began their legal
studies after high school in a university before taking two examinations.211
Practical training occurred between the two examinations, overseen by
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Japan’s national Legal Training and Research Institute.212 Unlike German
qualifying exams, however, the Institute’s first exam was so difficult that
the average successful applicant took it five times, which severely limited
the number of candidates admitted to practical training.213
In April 2004, Japan saw the opening of over sixty new law schools,214
which now resemble the education system of the United States and
implement a three-year graduate course.215 The wholesale appearance of
the law schools at one time was unprecedented, largely undertaken in the
face of pressure to produce more and better qualified attorneys.216 At least
one scholar, however, was unimpressed by Japan’s recent changes in the
legal profession, and saw such reform as insufficient to change the direction
of the study of law from being the historical preparation for a bar
examination to a socially beneficial and practical profession.217 Another
scholar agrees that “the attempt to incorporate [the U.S.-style] Socratic
system into Japan’s heavily-embedded Confucian teaching structure has
still not met all expectations. Namely, . . . students are narrow in breadth
and depth in various fields, and the overall quality of legal professionals
may not have significantly improved.”218 It has been admittedly difficult to
evaluate whether Japan’s comprehensive legal reform has led to real
change, and whether the new law schools have actually made Japan’s legal
market more competitive.219
Nevertheless, others acknowledge the
obstacles in breaking through tradition and old educational habits, and still
argue that Japan may realize significant benefits with continued patience
and perseverance.220 While the effects of the new school system may not be
concretely ascertained yet, the underlying ambition of the schools suggests
movement in the right direction of cultivating competition in the
international legal market,221 and has, at the very least, influenced the legal
education system of other countries, including Korea.222
212
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3. The Current Legal Market: A Symbiotic Relationship
Legal practice in Japan has become increasingly specialized.223 Over
the past decade, the bulk of work for large Japanese law firms has reverted
from cross-border to domestic matters.224 This surge in domestic work has
come from financial products, compliance and corporate governance, and
domestic litigation.225 Over the gradual opening of the market in 1986,
1994, and 2003, foreign law firms simultaneously became increasingly
successful at competing with domestic firms.226 Thus, Japanese law firms’
renewed focus on domestic law has also been spurred by foreign law firms’
greater share of work on cross-border legal transactions.227
As for predictions on future integrations or partnerships between
foreign law firms and Japanese law firms, the perspectives vary. Some
foreign firms with a Japan office have decided to stick to a particular
practice focus and remain independent, expressing no interest in recruiting
Japanese attorneys.228 Other firms with the same perspective indicate that
foreign clients wishing to do business in Japan are still best served by a
leading Japanese firm.229 A second perspective finds full integration
indistinguishable from the former joint enterprises first allowed in 1994.230
Joint enterprises have also allowed the carving of special relationships,
including partnerships between foreign firms and multiple Japanese
firms.231 Finally, as Linklaters did, others with a third perspective view the
single partnership between foreign and Japanese legal professionals as the
superior alternative to allow seamless advice to clients.232 Evidence and
sentiments suggest that the first two perspectives are preferred.
Currently, foreign involvement in Japan’s legal market is
overshadowed by one firm, Morrison & Foerster LLP (MoFo), which has
the largest practice of any international law firm in Japan.233 With over 120
attorneys,234 MoFo’s Tokyo office has grown forty-fold over the last two
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decades.235 MoFo arrived early on the scene, immediately after Law 66
first allowed for foreign participation in the legal market in 1986.236 The
firm became large after bolding the collapse of the bubble economy in
1991, continuing to send lawyers and draw clients.237 MoFo has held the
crown as the largest foreign office in Japan since as early as 2003,238 even
before the final legislation allowing for full integration between foreign and
Japanese law firms went into effect.239 By signaling to the Japanese
community that they came to Japan for the long haul, managing MoFo
partners indicated that they did not worry about competition.240 Other
foreign firms continue to struggle to win the loyalty of Japanese companies
that have established connections to firms like MoFo, and experimenting
international law firms will need greater ties to Japan to succeed, by
securing relationships with Japanese clients or having experienced Japanese
hands lead their practice.241 The firm rooting of MoFo has carried the day,
and MoFo’s continuation of its joint enterprise with Ito & Mitomi for over a
decade242 suggests that the 1994 amendment was and remains the most
influential step in Japan’s completed liberalization.
V.

A LOOK FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF KOREA’S LEGAL
MARKET

A. The Continued Success of Korean Law Firms
The preservation of local law firms in Korea will likely resemble the
developments seen in recent years in Japan, and not the history of firms in
Germany. When Korea and Japan received international pressure to open
their legal markets, Japan chose to succumb over the 1980s and 1990s while
Korea chose to do nothing.243 Korea has consequently been able to not only
observe the developments of the Japanese legal market as it opened to the
world, but since Korea has modeled its own gradual market liberalization
235
The office opened with three individuals in the 1980s. Heather Smith, Made in Japan,
AM. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 78, 78; Tokyo, supra note 233.
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after Japan’s, can also safely expect to see similar developments in the near
future. This is true in spite of the fact that Korea’s liberalization plans are
expected to roll out over the course of five years, while the same course in
Japan took nearly two decades, because Japan, taking a more cautious
approach, had no predecessor to look to for guidance. Japanese attorneys
have remained independent and continue to succeed, years through and
after their market’s liberalization,244 and their Korean counterparts will be
able to do the same—probably even better.
Specifically, the Korean legal market will largely remain unchanged
for five reasons—lessons drawn from Germany and Japan: (1) Korean law
firms have heavy man- and brain- power in providing full-service legal
counsel; (2) any foreign legal office or legal consultant expanding to Korea
will likely practice in a specialized niche of services, leaving local firms to
continue dominating domestic matters; (3) social appreciation for branding
will keep the elite Korean firms well respected and, for the same reason,
those few international firms with a history of handling Korean matters will
continue to outshine the market of foreign participation; (4) the number of
Korean corporations in need of foreign legal advice constitutes a very small
demand pool for foreign firms and attorneys; and (5) operating in Korea by
employing Korean-American attorneys will be a few steps more
complicated for U.K. firms than U.S. firms, leaving the market in U.S.
hands.
1. Lesson #1: Korea Has a Sophisticated Legal Market and Is
Implementing Recent Legal Education Reform
Unlike Germany in the early 1990s, and more like Japan following its
internal mergers, Korea is opening up a legal services market that is already
developed,245 and whose large law firms already number in the triple digits
of attorneys. The legal profession has grown rapidly in Korea,246 and the
rule of law has been widely accepted.247 Decades after the first spurt of
global expansion, firms largely remain conservative in their reach, and the
Korean legal community should make outmoded the popular concern of
being swallowed up in a similar merger mania as German firms saw in an
entirely different era.
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In particular, Korean attorneys handling corporate cases are highly
qualified, having gained considerable transactional experience through
corporate M&A matters during the Asian financial crisis of the late
1990s.248 A decade later, Korea was still experiencing soaring M&A
activity.249 Korean attorneys have also been recently recognized around the
world for their excellence in competition and trade matters, intellectual
property, and dispute resolution, in addition to their strength in corporate
matters.250 Korea’s largest law firm, Kim & Chang, boasts prominent
former judges and prosecutors, including former Korean Supreme Court
Justices, a Minister of Justice, and a Prosecutor General.251 In a late 2011
survey of the largest recent transactions involving targets or acquirers from
Asian regions, Korea was the only country whose largest transaction, at
$1.75 billion, involved entirely domestic counsel.252 In contrast, Japan’s
three largest transactions in late 2011 were counseled entirely by foreign
firms; no Japanese firms took the lead in providing legal advice for such
deals aggregately valued at over $18 billion.253
Still, Korea, like Japan,254 has recently implemented a new law school
system also modeled after U.S. graduate law schools with the aim of
producing qualified lawyers on a large scale.255 The reforms have been
targeted at addressing the same criticism Japan faced, namely that the
current legal education system256 guided students in exam-taking methods
rather than towards a legal and professional study to develop creative
problem solving skills.257 The twenty-five new U.S.-style postgraduate
248
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Korean law schools were launched in 2009, and the first class graduated in
February 2012.258 By 2017, Korea’s new law schools are supposed to
completely supplant the JTRI, that infamous institute that has denied
admission to thousands of trainees who have failed one of the world’s most
rigorous bar exams, although both systems of legal education operate side
by side for now.259 Upon graduation from the new law schools, students are
also taking a new, separate bar exam.260 Currently, while the total number
of law school students is limited to 2,000 per year, that number is double
the amount of attorneys who have been passing the original bar exam.261
Naturally, apart from the potential influx of foreign attorneys in the
Korean legal community, there is also some discomfort regarding the
internal competition between recent law graduates of the former JTRI and
the inaugural class of the new system.262 Since at least 2010,263 newly
graduated Korean attorneys under the earlier system have faced a tough
local market, but the prospect of an open Korean legal services market has
actually created more domestic jobs,264 and will likely continue, as firms
intellectual property, which is lacking in the supply of Korean attorneys of the former
system, and emphasizing the need for professional training and practice). For a more
skeptical analysis of the proposed benefits of the new law school system, see Nathan D.
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Streams?, KOR. L. TODAY (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.korealawtoday.com/2011/12/26/newkorean-law-school-and-bar-exam-system-fewer-dragons-from-streams/, in which an adjunct
professor at the JTRI suggests that the change will make the legal profession a club for the
wealthy and connected.
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bulk up brains in preparation for competition against foreign firms. 265
Regardless of whether the influx of a new breed of attorneys is homegrown
from a new legal education system or imported from abroad, a greater
number of attorneys is a healthy ingredient to engendering competition,
which is necessary to any successful services industry.266
While Korea may have yet to see what impact the adoption of its new
legal education system will have on the competitiveness of its legal market,
the complete transition to a system replacing the only process to practicing
law that Korea has ever known will undoubtedly lead to interesting
developments in decades to come. Hopefully, the more liberal education
and a focus away from memorization skills to pass one difficult bar exam
will allow Korean attorneys to better relate to and service their clients by
acquiring the skills to handle complex issues and to adapt to a changing
world earlier in their careers.267 Allowing students to pursue diverse
backgrounds in their undergraduate studies is expected to create a breed of
interdisciplinary future attorneys.268 On the other hand, evidence from
Japan has not been able to positively support this.269 Japanese firms may
still not be concretely reaping the benefits of legal education overhaul
modeled after U.S. law schools,270 but its dissatisfaction with its prior
duplication of a German-style legal education system271 serves as a
reminder that similar methods in different countries often cause varied
results, and Korea may see success.
The silver lining of the previous education system’s rigorous standards
is that they encouraged many Korean students failing the difficult bar exam
to resort to studies in the United States.272 Since the early 2000s, there has
been a substantial rise in the number of foreign law graduates in U.S. law
schools.273 In jurisdictions all over the world, foreign and local firms alike
have increasingly been relying on U.S.-educated and experienced local
practitioners.274 The role of LL.M. graduates from the United States, who
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earned their primary legal education in another country, is growing.275
These LL.M. graduates may seem to be the perfect choice for U.S. firms at
their branch offices abroad, but research indicates that the local firms are
the firms in those countries that have a substantial presence of such
graduates.276 In fact, in 2006, before the KORUS FTA was signed, at least
20% of the lawyers at top Korean law firms were Korean nationals with
foreign legal educations serving as informal legal consultants.277 Korea also
has a particularly strong tie to U.S. schools: in 2011, Korea sent about
seventeen times more students to pursue U.S. educations than India, twelve
times more than China, and about nine times more than Japan.278
Offering local expertise to international firms and a general familiarity
with U.S. law, these dual-educated attorneys enable their Korean law firm275
See Silver, supra note 122, at 7–9 (discussing the shift of law firms from staffing their
overseas offices by moving U.S.-licensed attorneys abroad to hiring attorneys licensed in the
host countries of those offices, or attorneys with host country ties).
276
See Silver, supra note 159, at 83.
277
Anthony Lin, Seoul Proprietors, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 127, 160.
278
These numbers are calculated based on ratios of students in the United States from
each country relative to each country’s total population. The students represent participation
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individuals in each country that would travel at all to the United States, such as the group of
individuals in the eighteen-to-forty age group, would present a better indication of the
comparable rate of students entering the United States. The underlying point, however, is
that behind the two countries that are home to over 1/3 of the world’s population, Korea
sends the most students to the United States annually in absolute numbers than any other
country. The student figures are based on research from the Institute of International
Education while the figures on population size are based on reports from the U.S.
Department of State. See INST. INT’L EDUC., OPEN DOORS FACT SHEET: CHINA (2011),
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employers to offer services without a U.S. law firm, translator, manager, or
other intermediary.279 The large number of Korean LL.M. students,
considered domestic legal consultants by trade, offers a competitive edge to
local Korean law firms.
2. Lesson #2: The Legal Profession Will Become Increasingly Specialized
in Korea
A few Korean firms, with their ears out for eventual foreign arrival,
did grow through conservative mergers and lateral hires.280 However, while
the president of the local bar association suggested that Korean law firms
needed to expand through mergers and the recruitment of laterals to sharpen
their competiveness with the anticipated influx of foreign law firms and
attorneys,281 it is unlikely and infeasible that the already small handful of
large Korean law firms need to further unite to fend their territory through
numbers. The largest law firm in Korea staffs over 800 professionals,282
and no foreign law firm aims to establish an equivalent presence in Korea in
absolute numbers283 in the way Eurocentric U.K. firms aggressed in
Germany.284 Although Korea’s geographic position is attractive for
business in Northern Asia, it is not currently nor imminently expected to be
an Asian financial center like Germany was in the 1990s, when firms
flocked to the area to maintain a competitive edge in a changing global
financial market. There is simply no business reason for U.K. or U.S. firms
to employ up to 25% of their global workforce285 in Korea or even to staff
the same on Korea-related matters whether originating from Korea or
elsewhere. If anything, when permitted, Korea may see the emergence of
ventures between slightly lower-tiered Korean law firms and smaller
foreign law firms who may see such partnerships as ways to bolster their
own less recognized practices, perhaps the way U.S. firms viewed their late
279
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281
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282
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attorneys.
Long-Distance Practice, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Jan. 1, 2011),
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. The second largest Korea practice staffs nine. Id. One of the first U.S. offices to open in
Korea is beginning with three attorneys and one staff member, with plans to expand to ten to
fifteen professionals over the next two years. Sara Randazzo, Sheppard Mullin, Ropes &
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2012),
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presence in Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.286
In addition, those Korean firms that have merged did so with the goal
of bolstering their practice areas where foreign firms are unlikely to
compete, such as regulatory practices and domestic litigation.287 The goal
of Korean firms in expansion is also not focused on growth exclusively
within Korea, but rather on establishing an international presence and
boosting their own overseas involvement in neighboring Asian countries.288
A focus back to exclusively practicing domestic law may or may not
be forthcoming in Korea, as has been the case in Japan, but niches will
likely still be created in the Korean legal market, driven mostly by the
incentives of the foreign firms. In some areas of the law, foreign firms with
an international practice in fields such as cross-border M&A transactions
and structured finance will likely dominate and should not be excluded
from those markets. Some Korean firms may acquire a similar international
presence and profile, enabling them to effectively compete with those
foreign firms, whereas others may choose to focus on purely domestic
matters of law, which usually do not attract competition from foreign firms
anyway. The same is true for U.S. firms that may advise Korean clients on
U.S. litigation, including intellectual property disputes, or U.S. government
regulatory issues—areas of the law that are contrastingly outside of the
scope of Korean legal practice.
Rather than compete for business, foreign attorneys and firms will find
it more profitable to operate in different spheres than their Korean
counterparts as they seek to facilitate business in the region, rather than
practice Korean law.289 That foreign firms have been focusing on certain
specialty areas that play to the firms’ strengths and existing clients’ needs is
not so different from the ways in which industries engaged in the sale of
goods have internationalized.290 Manufacturing and sale activities, taken
overseas, must adapt to the local markets, whether in Germany, Japan, or
Korea, and “selling internationally,” whether goods or services, means
redefining professional competence.291 For foreign firms and attorneys in
Korea, this means targeting major outbound deal work and limiting
practices to advising on non-Korean law.
286
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3. Lesson #3: The Heightened Value of Branding in Korea Will Keep Both
Elite Korean Law Firms and Long-Established Foreign Korea Practices at
the Top
Depending on the varying perspectives in Korea, Korean law firms
have the option to form fully integrated partnerships within five years of the
implementation of the KORUS FTA or to maintain any joint ventures that
may have been created within that time, or may simply continue
independent practices. Because the competitive strength of Korean firms
relies in part on their uniquely elite status in Korean society, the most
successful Korean firms will likely opt to continue their well-regarded
independent practices.292 In the international market, trust comes with the
brand of the firm,293 and this will prove to be even truer in a society like
Korea, where consumers are known to be very brand-conscious.294 Korean
firms as well as their gratified Korean clients will take pride in maintaining
the status of the elite Korean law firm and its esteemed reputation, making
the idea of an alliance with a foreign firm unattractive to some of the top
Korean firms.295
In the same vein, the international firms that have built Korea-focused
practices from Hong Kong or Tokyo are few,296 and their presence as the
go-to foreign firms on Korean matters is likely to remain strong, whether
they or others open offices in Korea. The U.S. firm, Cleary Gottlieb Steen
& Hamilton LLP (Cleary), holds the title as Korea’s leading foreign
international practice.297 Its current lead has resulted from its delivery of
sophisticated services that please its Korean clients, but its initial entry into
the local market was more a result of timing and fortune.298
Cleary’s Korea practice head, Jinduk Han, turned out to be the only
Korean-speaking U.S. securities lawyer available to help out Korean
292
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corporations in the late 1990s when they were just beginning to open
themselves to foreign capital.299 Han personally approached major Korean
companies to explain the processes of U.S. debt offerings, after Rule 144A
of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission cleared the way for U.S.
institutional investors to participate in foreign issues.300 The Korean
government later turned to Cleary for help with the country’s collapsing
banking system during the Asian financial crisis.301 Han referred to what
then ensued as a snowballing effect for the firm, where “[o]ne deal led to
another, and the same issuers started doing repeat deals.”302 Confident that
Cleary will retain its lead in Korea even with the KORUS FTA, Cleary’s
attorneys point to their depth and expertise, the difficulty other firms would
face to catch up with Cleary’s longstanding track record in Korea, and the
fact that others have already shown up and left.303
The example of MoFo in Japan may be Cleary’s forerunner in Korea.
In fact, Cleary closed a failing office in Tokyo in 2006, bringing eighteen
years of practice to an end.304 The fate of these two firms in Korea and
Japan demonstrates the value of relational ties and history in these legal
services markets, and suggests that the few foreign firms with established
names in Korea will remain strong, while newly venturing international
firms will vie for clients who are already largely satisfied with what they
have. In fact, these firms with strong Korea ties find the move into Seoul
more a formality of perceived reputational competition and expectation than
a necessity to continue business as usual.305 The importance of branding to
Korean clientele will play a role in the success of foreign firms, and the
handful of U.S. firms with an established presence in Korea can thus sit
back and relax for the time being.
4. Lesson #4: Korean Clients with International Legal Concerns Are Too
Few to Demand a Large Foreign Supply Pool
The impact of branding to Korean clients on narrowing the list of
viable foreign law firm openings in Korea will further be compounded by
the nature of Korean commercial infrastructure—Korea has only a very
small band of very big companies. Not only will the handful of prestigious

299

Id.
Id.
301
See U.S. Law Firm to Open Office in Korea, CHOSUN ILBO (Nov. 30, 2011 10:30AM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/11/30/2011113001120.html.
302
Lin, supra note 297.
303
Id.
304
See Cleary Calls Time on Tokyo, THELAWYER.COM (June 5, 2006),
http://www.thelawyer.com/cleary-calls-time-on-tokyo/120214.article.
305
See discussion infra Part V.B; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.1 (explaining
Japan’s internal mergers).
300

273

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:237 (2012)

Korean and established foreign firms continue to overshadow the Korean
legal services market, but the sole consumers of that market, the large
Korean clients seeking the advice of foreign attorneys, are themselves only
a few.306
The presence of powerful domestic conglomerates in Korea is a result
of the history of chaebols, or exclusive family-run business groups.307
Birthed in the 1960s, Korean chaebols played a major role in getting the
Korea’s economy to where it is today and they continue to have great
influence.308 Philippe Shin, a senior FLC at the major Korean firm of Shin
& Kim, acknowledges the chaebols as a “fixture of Korean life at all levels
of society.”309 Indeed, the most familiar Korean names around the world
are these chaebols, including Samsung, Hyundai, and LG.310 The growth of
chaebols was correspondingly accompanied by the historical
underdevelopment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs),311 and even
today, Korean companies “tail off dramatically in size after the big names
are counted.”312 The largest of companies with a significant amount of
overseas work that trigger international legal concerns currently constitute
306
Anthony Lin, Law Firms Crowding Into Korea, ASIAN LAW. (July 13, 2012),
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the entire demand for foreign firms operating in Korea and may be as few
as fifteen.313
In contrast, SMEs have flourished in Japan as major employers and
exporters,314 leading to the existence of a vast second tier of large Japanese
companies, including many technology companies in need of advice on
intellectual property disputes in different jurisdictions abroad.315
Consequently, while litigation may generally be an area of growth for
foreign firms practicing in Asia, the prospect in Korea involves “a limited
company list and a large pool of lawyers trying to service it”316 that will be
much more challenging to break through317 than might be the case for firms
looking to markets with more diversified corporations, as in Germany, or
with vibrant SMEs, such as Japan. This challenge will again be made more
difficult by the allegiance some large companies already have to their
desired Korean firms.318
5. Lesson #5: U.K. Firms Facing Hurdles Will Be Further Reluctant to
Enter Korea
Finally, while the buzz surrounding the earlier KOREU FTA
suggested that U.K. firms might have an early mover advantage over U.S.
firms who awaited Congress’ ratification of the KORUS FTA, no U.K. firm
had made any announcements of opening a Korea office by the end of
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2011.319 Halfway through 2012, only one U.K. firm had successfully
applied to open a Seoul office while the roster of U.S. firms engaged in the
approval process grew to over ten.320 In the background, Korea has always
had stronger personal ties with the United States,321 based on immigration
and students studying abroad,322 giving U.S. firms easier access to the large
population of Korean-Americans and Korean nationals studying at top U.S.
law schools to head their Korea practices.323 Furthermore, practical
implications of the FLCA’s language are also keeping U.K. firms a few
more steps away than U.S. firms from setting up shops in Korea.
On a more technical level, the FLCA—the Korean statute that
specifies the qualifications for entry into the legal services market—
provides that FLCs in Korea must have at least three years of experience
practicing324 and be limited to providing advice on the laws of the country
in which they are licensed.325 Although the same registered FLCs may also
provide legal advice on generally approved international customary law as
well as international arbitration proceedings,326 many U.K.-employed, U.S.trained attorneys will not be eligible to register as FLCs in Korea.
Many lawyers in U.K. firms’ Korea practices, either Korean-American
or Korean nationals with U.S. legal educations, are U.S.-qualified,327 and
will automatically fail to meet one of the FLCA’s prerequisites for
practicing in Korea if they have never practiced in the United States or are
not officially U.K.-qualified.328 There are very few Korean-speaking
attorneys with U.K. qualifications at U.K. firms, and even less with three
years of experience officially practicing in the U.K. that would give them
eligibility to be an FLC, let alone to advise on U.K. law.329 U.K. firms with
319
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an eye on opening offices in Korea must hope to have in their employ
Korean-speaking attorneys already admitted as U.K. solicitors, or ask them
to go through the processes of first becoming U.K.-qualified and then
waiting while practicing for three years to meet the experience
requirement.330
U.S. law, however, and not U.K. law, has long been favored for crossborder deals in Korea,331 and as such, there may not even be much of a
market for counsel from U.K.-qualified, trained, and experienced attorneys
in Korea. Consequently, such U.K. firms’ U.S.-trained attorneys would
have to switch to advising on U.S. law, in which they also may not have the
requisite three years of experience. While a technical hurdle, these few
extra steps will keep U.K. firms lacking attorneys with automatic FLC
eligibility from making the move into Seoul, leaving the market to the U.S.
firms that lead it anyway. U.K. firms are currently experiencing a Korea
that is much like the Germany U.S. firms faced in the 1990s—one that is
less attractive and less accessible.
B. Evidence in Action So Far
Legal media and international firm attorneys have been making
forecasts about firms’ moves for years. On the eve of Korea’s ratification
of the KORUS FTA, many leading Korea practice attorneys of foreign
firms were expressing reservations about relocating to Seoul, citing
children’s commitments to international schools, preference for warmer
weather, lower taxes, and the more expat-friendly environment of Hong
Kong.332
Cleary’s own head Korea practice attorney, Han, was
noncommittal about a move in the fall of 2011, stating that a launch in
Korea would be less about filling any gaps in their practices, and more
about addressing perceptions.333 Another Korea practice head expressed the
example, is U.S.-qualified, admitted to practice in the state of New York, and may not have
the requisite licensing or years of experience officially practicing in the U.K. to advise on
U.K. law.
See id.; Profile of Hyun Suk Kim, CLIFFORD CHANCE,
http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_us/find_people_and_offices/partners/cn/hyun_suk_ki
m.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). Not surprisingly, the new Korea office will be led by
Brian Cassidy, a U.K.-qualified attorney. Clifford Chance Approved to Open in Republic of
Korea,
CLIFFORD
CHANCE
(July
16,
2012),
http://www.cliffordchance.com/news/news/2012/07/clifford_chance_approvedtoopeninrepub
licofkorea.html [hereinafter Clifford Chance Approved]; Profile of Brian Cassidy, CLIFFORD
CHANCE,
http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_us/find_people_and_offices/lawyers/cn/brian_cassidy.
html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
330
See Lin, supra note 327.
331
Lin, supra note 323.
332
Ben Lewis, First Into Seoul? No Thanks, ASIAN LAW. (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202531163858.
333
Id.
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same sentiments, saying that a physical presence in Korea would add little
value to those firms with preexisting strong relationships with key Korean
clients.334 At the same time, this attorney also believed that if some made
the move, others would be bound to follow as a defensive measure,335
reminiscent of the pioneering U.K. firms in Germany336 and the internal
mergers in Japan.337
However, those firms that would be at all susceptible to such a herd
mentality are limited to the few international firms that already have a
prominently established Korea practice. Unlike the frenzy of match-making
that mega foreign and local firms faced in Germany, or the perceived
reputational competition that may have prompted internal mergers in Japan,
the foreigners with a viable Korea practice have already made their lead in
that practice known to the legal community around the world.
Consequently, Korea will still not likely see an invasion by every large
international law firm with some business in East Asia, simply because a
few start to make the move. In fact, 113 of the Am Law 200 firms 338 have
just one foreign office or none at all, but almost all are nonetheless finding
their work to be increasingly global from within U.S. borders.339 Simply
put, many firms are comfortable where they are, and are not looking
forward to facing a new learning curve by physically relocating to Korea,
an environment that will present different regulations and new cultural and
social nuances,340 which they can continue to avoid in their current offices.
As of January 2013, a number of firms had officially opened, applied
to open, or expressed interest in or plans to open a Korea office. These
include U.K.-based Clifford Chance LLP,341 Herbert Smith,342 and
334

Id.
Id.
336
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
337
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
338
The Am Law 200 is an annually ranked list of firms in the United States analyzing
firm financials over the year, including gross revenue, profits per partner, and value per
lawyer compiled and published in the periodical, The American Lawyer. See generally The
Am Law 200 2011, AM. LAW., June 2011, at 70; The Am Law 100 2011, AM. LAW., May
2011, at 77.
339
See Rachel Breitman, Think Global, Stay Local, AM. LAW., Oct. 2008, at 147, 147.
340
See Cullen Wheatley & Taejin Park, U.S. Law Firms Plan to Follow Trade Deal With
Korea Offices, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 2, 2011, 5:42 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-02/u-s-law-firms-plan-to-follow-trade-dealwith-korea-offices.html.
341
See Clifford Chance Approved, supra note 329; Brian Baxter, Clifford Chance, DLA
Look to New Asian Locales, THE AMLAW DAILY (Mar. 24, 2011, 2:38 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/03/south-korea-mongolia.html.
342
Jessica Seah, British Firms Ponder Korea Without Koreans, ASIAN LAW. (Oct. 29,
2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleAL.jsp?id=1202576630640&British_Firms_Pon
335
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Linklaters;343 Swiss Vereins Baker & McKenzie344 and DLA Piper;345 and
eleven large U.S.-based firms: Ropes & Gray LLP,346 Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP,347 Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,348 Paul
Hastings LLP,349 McDermott Will & Emery,350 Squire Sanders,351
der_Korea_Without_Koreans=&et=editorial&bu=The%20American%20Lawyer&cn=Asian
Lawyer_21021029&src=EMCEmail&pt=The%20Asian%20Lawyer&kw=British%20Firms%20Ponder%20Korea%20Wit
hout%20Koreans&slreturn=20121023060738; Lin, supra note 306.
343
Seah, supra note 342.
344
Baker & McKenzie Has Applied to the Korean Authorities to Open Seoul Office,
BAKER
&
MCKENZIE
(Nov.
20,
2012),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/news/BakerMcKenzieKoreanOpenSeoulOffice/.
345
Alanna Byrne, 3 More Law Firms Hope to Open in South Korea, INSIDECOUNSEL
(June 25, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/25/3-more-law-firms-hope-to-openin-south-korea; Jim Vassallo, U.S. Law Firms Can Practice in South Korea in 2012, JD J.
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.jdjournal.com/2011/11/28/u-s-law-firms-can-practice-in-southkorea-in-2012/ (legal blog discussing interest of DLA Piper in opening Korea office). By
forming the Swiss Verein in 2008, DLA Piper emphasized that it was neither a U.K. nor U.S.
firm.
Margaret Taylor, DLA Gets Green Light for Swiss Verein Conversion,
THELAWYER.COM (June 30, 2008), http://www.thelawyer.com/dla-gets-green-light-forswiss-verein-conversion/133593.article.
346
Randazzo, supra note 283 (William Kim, Ropes & Gray’s lead Korea attorney
explaining that the firm “felt it was important to try to win the race” in order “to show
Korean clients, the government, and everybody in Korea [the firm’s] commitment and
dedication”); Ropes & Gray Opens Korea’s First International Law Office, ROPES & GRAY
LLP, http://www.ropesgray.com/20120720koreaannouncement/ [hereinafter Ropes & Gray
Opens] (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
347
Sheppard Mullin Opens Seoul Office, SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.sheppardmullin.com/press-releases-346.html (announcing its
status as one of the first three U.S. and EU approved law firms to open in Korea).
348
Steger, supra note 320; Simpson Thacher to Open Office in Seoul, Korea, SIMPSON
THACHER
&
BARTLETT
LLP
(Dec.
13,
2011),
http://www.stblaw.com/siteContent.cfm?contentID=3&itemID=74&focusID=3186.
349
Paul Hastings First U.S. Law Firm to Submit Preliminary Applications in Relation to
Foreign Legal Consultant Office in Korea, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.paulhastings.com/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsId=258559 [hereinafter Paul Hastings
First]; Jessica Seah, Paul Hastings, Ropes & Gray Announce Korea Offices, ASIAN LAW.
(Mar.
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleAL.jsp?id=1202544514045&Paul_Hastings_Ropes__
Gray_Announce_Korea_Offices; Zusha Elinson, Pact Would Open South Korean Law
Market,
RECORDER
(Apr.
6,
2007),
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=900005478038 (expressing interest in
2007 of having an office in Seoul as soon as allowed).
350
McDermott to Open in South Korea, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.mwe.com/McDermott-to-Open-in-South-Korea-02-14-2012/.
351
Squire Sanders Korea Practice Leader Joon Yong Kim Registered as Foreign Legal
Consultant by Korean Bar Association, SQUIRE SANDERS (July 25, 2012),
http://www.squiresanders.com/squire-sanders-korea-practice-leader-joon-yong-kimregistered-as-foreign-legal-consultant-by-korean-bar-association/; Squire Sanders Plans to
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Korea
Office,
SQUIRE
SANDERS
(Mar.
6,
2012),
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Covington & Burling LLP,352 O’Melveny & Myers LLP,353 K&L Gates
LLP,354 McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP,355 and of course, Cleary.356 At
least two U.S. firms of less than fifty attorneys have also applied to open
offices in Korea.357 Others, such as U.K.-based Freshfields and Allen &
Overy LLP, have indicated that they currently have no plans to open an
office in Seoul, expecting to continue their Korea practices out of Hong
Kong.358 The scorecard so far seems to suggest, therefore, that firms are
making the expected moves, with the few U.S. firms having extensive
Korea practices taking the lead, U.K. firms largely staying put, and Korean
firms standing tall.
C. Other General Benefits of the Liberalization
Ending this analysis on the positive expectations of liberalization, this
subpart summarizes its commonly cited benefits, which include better
quality and accountability of legal services. For example, one immediate
practical effect from the FLCA and FTAs will be a working registration
system to recognize foreign attorneys as either individual proprietors or a
member of an FLC office.359 It is no secret that a large number of foreign
attorneys have already been working in Korea for over three decades as

http://www.squiresanders.com/de/squire-sanders-plans-to-open-korea-office/.
352
Catherine Ho, Covington Joins Wave of Law Firms Opening Offices in Korea,
CAPITAL
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BLOG
(Mar.
13,
2012,
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PM),
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Seoul Office, Adds William H.Y. Park, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.cov.com/news/detail.aspx?news=1728.
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O’Melveny to Open Office in South Korea, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (June 19,
2012), http://omm.com/newsroom/News.aspx?news=2693.
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Maria Chutchian, K&L Gates, McKenna Long Set Sights on S. Korea, LAW360 (June
22, 2012 9:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/353473/k-l-gatesmckenna-long-set-sights-on-s-korea.
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Id.
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Steger, supra note 320; Cleary Gottlieb to Open Office in Seoul, CLEARY GOTTLIEB
STEEN
&
HAMILTON
LLP
(Nov.
28,
2011),
http://www.cgsh.com/cleary_gottlieb_to_open_office_in_seoul/ (announcing plans to open
an office in the first half of 2012); Ben Lewis, Cleary to Open Korea Office, ASIAN LAW.
(Nov.
28,
2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202533591551&Cleary_to_Open_Korea_Office
(stating that the firm had no plans to enter into an alliance with a Korean firm).
357
See Lin, supra note 306 (Cohen & Gresser and H.C. Park & Associates, PLC); Tom
Brennan, New York Boutique Firm Joins Korea Rush, ASIAN LAW. (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleAL.jsp?id=1202572695276&New_York_Boutiq
ue_Firm_Joins_Korea_Rush (Cohen & Gresser).
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Seah, supra note 342.
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Quarterly Updates, supra note 46; see also supra notes 85, 87 and accompanying text.
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legal consultants to Korean clients.360 They have essentially practiced law
in Korea and required only the final approval signature on documents by a
Korean attorney.361 With the open and official acceptance of these foreign
attorneys, the granting of licenses and registration through the Korean Bar
Association and approval of the Ministry of Justice362 will help Korea
maintain professional and ethical standards.363
In addition, the FLCA’s requirement that FLCs reside in Korea for at
least 180 days per year364 may lead to quicker and better cultural
understanding as well as the building of relationships. Similarly, limiting
entry to attorneys with at least three years of work experience365 and to
firms that have had at least five years of normal operation366 in their home
countries ensures that both businesses and attorneys have an adequate level
of expertise. Finally, requiring that the main office of foreign firms
guarantee civil or commercial liabilities relating to the office’s business367
deters potential legal misconduct or malpractice. Over the next years, the
legal community hopes to see benefits to domestic consumers for legal
services as well as improved efficiency and quality of the legal services
market in Korea.368
VI. CONCLUSION
From a bird’s-eye view, the Korean legal services market will
probably not fundamentally change in the near future. A close-up view of
only the top law firms in Korea may, however, demonstrate an expansion in
the role and range of work activities of elite Korean attorneys.
Comparisons in Korea to developments of foreign law firms in Germany
are both faulty and obsolete, while the more relevant example of Japanese
trends has been so far difficult to measure and evaluate. However, all
interested parties—local law firms, international law firms, governments,
360

See, e.g., Clifford Chance Approved, supra note 329 (“Our office in Seoul is a natural
extension of our over 30-year history of working with Korean clients.”); Ropes & Gray
Opens, supra note 346 (“[T]he firm has established more than two decades of service to
Korean clients . . . .”); Paul Hastings First, supra note 349 (highlighting the firm’s twentyfive years of experience in Korea to include advising Samsung Electronics and Dong-A
Pharmaceuticals).
361
Suzuki, supra note 48, at 392.
362
Quarterly Updates, supra note 46.
363
See Waegukbeobjamunsahbeob [Foreign Legal Consultant Act], Act No. 9524, Mar.
25, 2009, arts. 28, 32, 36–53 (S. Kor.) (ethical standards, supervision by the Minister of
Justice and Korean Bar Association, disciplinary actions, and penal provisions).
364
Id. art. 29(1).
365
Id. art. 4(1).
366
Id. art. 16(1).1.
367
Id. art. 16(1).4.
368
See Chapman & Tauber, supra note 58, at 954–56.
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attorneys, and businesses both large and small—should continue to strive to
find those collaborations that best serve progress and growth in the context
of the time and specific places in which they exist.
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